tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4233657442993029268.post8764999453216233790..comments2023-07-23T20:33:23.506+08:00Comments on Convex Set: Measuring the Mandate of the People: Approval Votingconvexsethttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15927845454664208973noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4233657442993029268.post-67447612334111004292012-01-29T00:15:23.913+08:002012-01-29T00:15:23.913+08:00Somehow I forgot to respond to this. Yes, you are ...Somehow I forgot to respond to this. Yes, you are right. Approval voting is vulnerable to strategic behaviour. But you have misinterpreted the Annex. It talks about a simple model of preferences with only two levels of desirability. To the extent that this is applicable in real life, approval voting is resistant to strategic voting.convexsethttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15927845454664208973noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4233657442993029268.post-52606403524945165402011-09-02T13:16:00.300+08:002011-09-02T13:16:00.300+08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4233657442993029268.post-23179343912767984552011-09-02T13:14:25.711+08:002011-09-02T13:14:25.711+08:00I am a co-founder of The Center for Election Scien...I am a co-founder of The Center for Election Science, and we heavily promote Score Voting, including Approval Voting (effectively a 0 or 1 "score").<br /><br />However, it is not correct to say that Approval Voting is immune from strategy. It is highly resistant to the negative <em>effects</em> of strategy.<br /><br />Here are two examples. Say that you prefer A>B>C>D, and B and C are the presumed frontrunners. Then you want to approve of A and B. But say C and D are the frontrunners. Then you want to approve everyone but D.<br /><br />There are even cases where you might want to vote for A and C, but <em>not</em> B or D!<br />http://ScoreVoting.net/RVstrat2.html<br /><br />In general, I would put the focus on Bayesian Regret as the "one right measure" of voting method performance, including vulnerability to tactical voting.<br />http://ScoreVoting.net/BayRegsFig.htmlAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com