Goh Keng Swee on the Kind of Armed Forces Needed to Defend Singapore

"You are a Prime Minister but you have no army. How are you going to defend yourself?"

— Goh Keng Swee to Lee Kuan Yew, who had wanted a small part-time, low-cost militia

Goh Keng Swee understood that such a tiny force would be useless as a defence force. Thinking in terms of multi-period dynamics, he conceptualized a system where, each year, men of a certain age group would undergo full-time training and thereafter be part of a reserve force which would have their skills periodically refreshed. Should the need arise, an additional force perhaps more than five times the size of the full-time force might be called upon in the defence of Singapore.

Attribution: The above quote was lifted from The New Paper's Founding Fathers series.

Handling the Defence of Singapore in the 21st Century

(Note: Post backdated to date of original writing.)

Two articles were published on TOC in June, Conscription: Necessary Or Outdated? (Bryan Cheang, 20 June 2012) and Rethinking Singapore’s Defence Needs (Rajiv Chaudhry, 25 June 2012), which I found to be rather off the mark. Thankfully, soon after, another article which had, I feel, a more realistic perspective on things, Conscription: The Missing Perspective (Benjamin Cheah, 3 July 2012), was posted. I would like to comment on what has been said and add, what I hope is, a little more to the discussion.

A "New Normal"??
It is naive to think that "in this age of moderation" a "new normal" has emerged characterized by all manner of warm and fuzzy sounding buzz words. Rajiv Chaudhry and, to a lesser extent, Bryan Cheang seem to think that everyone else is good and just today. But look at the way children act when unsupervised, how often do you see bigger kids taking things away from the smaller ones. Similarly, big dogs steal food from smaller dogs. In fact, for most living X's, big X's steal food from small X's unless the small X's are able to secure protection for themselves. Similarly, defence solutions have to give tangible security guarantees.

It is notable that the United States has been rather consistent in offering assistance to victims of aggression only when its interests are at stake. Certainly, Singapore has substantial strategic value as a friend to the United States, however this value to the USA is positional and is the same even is Singapore becomes an island of bombed out ruins. In the grand scheme of things, our economy is of little value to the USA, and we should remember that. More generally, military alliances and pacts to offer assistance can be breached if they are not in the counter-party's interests to honour the terms. We have to be aware that military intervention involves real costs that have to be justified from the point of view of others.

Lee Kuan Yew has one thing right: the truth about inter-country relations is that we can be friends only if we respect each others' strength. If friendships between sentimental human beings can be ephemeral, how much more fleeting can "friendships" between unfeeling nations be? Presently, deterrence is the only real way to be sure that military capabilities that can otherwise be used as a means to expropriate our property and sovereignty are not.

The Need to Intelligently Provision for Defence
I am no big fan of the SAF and its (often sycophantic) "high potentials", but let us not kid ourselves. The SAF must be sufficiently provisioned to, at least, give the semblance of being a credible force with considerable sting. The sting must be sufficiently strong to skew the cost-benefit analysis of whether or not to infringe on our sovereignty towards a "no". However, this sting comes at a cost, and we have to obtain and sustain military capabilities cost effectively. Thus, it is important that senior officers in the SAF do not adopt a "don't ask me about money, I only train" attitude or a "I only need to manage my multi-year acquisition over my tenure of two years and look good before I post out" attitude. This is not a casual swipe at career soldiers, these attitudes are not uncommon and are highly costly to Singapore. Management of those managing the acquisition and operation of military systems needs to account for the prevailing incentives and structure remuneration and advancement in a manner that promotes military strength and cost effectiveness.

On the matter of manpower, I would argue that cutting the NS and reservist liabilities based on "what others are doing", as Rajiv Chaudhry suggests, is unthinking and silly. There are ways to do so intelligently but incrementally. Let me provide a simple example:

Consider having only 7 compulsory ICTs, the last of which is an ATEC assessment. If the reservist battalion passes, they are done with their reservist liability and will transition into the MINDEF Reserve. Otherwise they will come back for the 8th, 9th and perhaps 10th re-test sessions. This gives the incentive to build competence and also cuts the effective liability.

Granted, this is an incremental solution, but it is far better than blind copying and is likely to improve readiness as well. Similar principles can probably be applied to cutting the duration spent in full-time NS. A driven force is an effective force. It does not matter if "ORD" is what drives our NSFs to perform.

In the longer term, force structuring is the way forward to reducing ("right-sizing") the defence foot print. The ORBAT (Order of Battle) must be fluid, allowing reductions in some areas and increases in others. Capabilities will have to match the threat landscape, and capabilities that are less relevant have to be phased. Opposition to any reduction in command positions would reflect ego problems and rather than any substantive defence issue.

The Ability to Use Capabilities
The ability to effectively use equipment is crucial. The best soccer boots on an amateur team will not help them beat a barefoot Germany (because to use Brazil would simply be unfair). The man is more important than the machine.

During periods of tension, the best that can be done is to call men back for re-orientation with their equipment. How can it be expected that we will be able to use our equipment well. If technology is a force-multiplier, the lack of expertise in the use of that equipment is a force-divider. The natural question that arises is whether that number resolves to something greater or lesser than unity. Having this as the best option available to us seems to reflect a lack of foresight on the part of senior MINDEF/SAF officials/officers.

As equipment requires increasing amounts of practice and knowledge of its workings to use properly, the dictum that we do not want to have too many Singaporeans of working age tied up in the regular force has to be called into question. Economic output may suffer somewhat, but more soldiers will have the time required to build up their ability in the use of our high-tech equipment. This old assumption will have to be re-examined.

Conclusion
As Benjamin Cheah notes, the geography of the region puts us at a distinct strategic and tactical disadvantage. We have to be smart about how we handle defence. We must provision intelligently and ensure that our men have the ability to leverage our expensively obtained capabilities.

If we were to return to the issue of NS which started all this, in my mind, it would be appropriate to have a larger regular force for skill-development along with variable length NSF and reservist periods (based on demonstrated effectiveness). It might well turn out, that increased economic participation and longer economic life of Singapore males due to effective reductions in their NS liabilities more than pays for the increase in the size of the regular force.

Ramblings on "Capabilities" and Aggression

It is somewhat interesting to note that the Roman Empire had little or no naval capability until the beginnning of the second phase of the First Punic War, which was marked precisely by the build up of a non-trivial naval force. Circular and somewhat uninformative definition aside, the Romans were extremely pragmatic in their military build up, especially given that its military consisted mainly the upper crust of Roman society who probably would not have liked to be assigned command of forces with no prospect of prestige through victory. Prior to battling Carthage across the ocean, Roman wars were land based and did not necessitate the use of naval power.

(Disclaimer: These are musings of a half-awake engineer on the way to work. I have not read Clausewitz or any military treatises and am not at all familiar with "the literature" in so far as it pertains to this.)

This interesting tidbit led me to think about the "capability" thought revolution in militaries around the world. It seems to me that almost every capability that people speak of are damage inflicting or coordinating. It seems that defensive capabilities such as detection and recovery (under a given damage loading) are a bit of a second thought. Perhaps the popularity of discussing "capabilities" began in the Cold War's era of deterrence where game theoretic response matching was the calculus of choice. The utility/benefit functions used naturally related to the amount of damage one could inflict on a foe and how much that foe might inflict on one. Those functions were typically dominantly based on (offensive) capabilities with little consideration of those of the defensive sort. This is the narrative that arises from the records of recorded discussions on the "first strike" and "second strike" capabilities of both sides and how they generated the uneasy equilibrium.

The view of a military "capability" as an offensive one by default is interesting in view of the fact that it was a defensive capability that won the Cold War for the USA. By largely neutralizing Soviet strike capabilities, the Soviet Union was left naked and with the two options of investing heavily in strike or investing heavily defence. The lack of economic capacity of the Soviet union and the pursuit of heavy investment... you know the rest.

It strikes me that the synonymous relationship of "capability" and "strike" is a manifestation of the aggressive tendencies of a military caste (or those with warrior pretensions). However, we should be aware of the historical record and the need for both a spear and a shield. Thankfully, there are those in Singapore who are interested in "resilience". I shall not talk about where we are at, however. (I don't even pretend to have a complete picture.) My own interest in the topic are in measurement and my view of may be summarized as comprising of enemy action, impact on resources, their reallocation to support "capabilities" and the corresponding impact on the performance of those "capabilities".

While we invest heavily in strike capabilities, we should be aware of the perennial defender's advantage (which can be neutralized by less tasteful forms of warfare, that in turn would probably provoke a very heavy handed international response). The defender's advantage is precious and should be bolstered. For instance through the ability to bust out of a blockade (the modern day seige). Investment in a good defence requires far more investment in offence to overcome. (This differential is lessened in computer games to prevent too much turtling.)

It is at this point where I must conclude these ramblings. And quite abruptly.

Cutting the NS Outlay while Improving "Readiness"

I would like to add detail to a previous post on revising National Service in view of the intent behind its original design and the strategic picture of defence today.

We can reduce the reservist cycle and at the same time increase our "readiness". In so far as "readiness" is positively associated with how seriously our reservists take their training, there is an obvious way to do both things simultaneously. Suppose we cut the reservist cycle down to 8 mandatory in-camp training sessions with at least 5 high-key sessions (down from 7), with up to 2 more high-key ICTs should performance in the ATEC appraisals not be satisfactory. (These appraisals are are done by assessors outside the unit in question.)

The incentives are clear. Soldiers will train hard for themselves and their friends to avoid the two possible "remedial training" sessions. By and large, we would expect to cut down the reservist cycle down to 8 in-camp sessions (down by 2 high-key ICTs) and experience an improvement in training standards. This is a win for the public purse, a win for the soldiers, and a win for national defence.

Once again, let me reiterate that cutting the cycle is realistic given the realities of modern warfare. The reader may refer to the previous article for the (short) argument. Now let me move to estimates of the potential annual cost savings.

With 35000 per cohort of NSFs/reservists, expected to be earning $3000 per month by the time they have served 8 ICTs, and given that a high-key ICT takes up at least 40% of the days of a month, the reduction will save about $84M. This is not too shabby, but it is only about 0.7% of the defence budget.

Some Thoughts on National Service

In the second volume of MM Lee's memoirs From Third World To First, The Singapore Story: 1965 - 2000, (in the chapter "Building an Army from Scratch") he quotes Goh Keng Swee:

It is foolish to allow ourselves to be hypnotised by the disparity in the population ratios between Singapore and her neighbours. What counts is the fighting strength of the armed forces, not the size of the populations. ... After five years of conscription we can field an army of 150,000 by mobilising those on the reserve service. By using older persons and women for non-combatant duties we should eventually be able to field an army with a combat strength of 250,000 consisting of men between the ages of 18 and 35. The war-making potential of a small, vigorous, well-educated and highly motivated population should never be underestimated.

The message is clear. Where fighting strength matters, our NS-reservist system delivers. It is clear, however, that today fighting strength is not what matters. In the present-day military environment, having a technology edge and using it effectively is what creates a decisive edge.

Given that we do have a regional technology edge. The challenge is using it effectively. We need people to be well trained in the use of our systems. As such, there is scope to study a compression (and possibly reduction) of the reservist cycle.

The argument for compression is clear. Soldiers should not have huge gaps between the times they train with their equipment. To understand the case for reduction, note that it stands to reason that even with a full reservist cycle (in terms of the number of high-key and low-key call-ups), there will be a fall in proficiency over time. Cutting off the tail end associated with low proficiency would make sense. It would also ensure that equipment is available for training given the larger number of reservists being called up in the compressed cycle.

More analysis will be needed to come to a conclusion, especially vis a vis the effects of a compressed reservist cycle on the early careers of non-university graduates who enter the workforce shortly after their ORD. It may turn out it may be best for "high-tech" platoons to be mixed and matched with larger sub-units going through the slower cycle.

More analysis will be needed. It is time for MINDEF officials to earn their pay and address this fundamental issue.

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Afternote: Previously, in a (somewhat presumptuously) titled post "Force Structure Amid Transformation", I proposed a restructuring of National Service with the intent of improving learning (and hence effectiveness) with respect to equipment that requires substantial training to use effectively (especially relatively high-tech equipment).

On Fairness in National Service

The recent fracas about Dr Patrick Tan, son of presidential hopeful and former DPM Tony Tan, arguably escaping a doing proper NS term raises the old issue of fairness. Let me outline some of the relevant considerations:

1. Patrick Tan's background would have made him a suitable "Defence Medical Scientist".
2. If the position was created just for him, it points to nepotism. On the other hand, it may have been his case which highlighted the usefulness of creating such a post.
3. If the position was not retained following his exit, the evidence of MINDEF functioning with both fear and favour would be rather damning.

I haven't been able to find anything about the role/career of "Defence Medical Scientist" on the MINDEF, DSO and DSTA web pages, so I've tentatively resolved the greyness for myself on this matter.

On my own experience, I myself disrupted, did my undergrad degree and my masters in what might essentially be operations research (same as Tony Tan amusingly, and at the same institution). Now, when I came back, I returned to 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards to a combat role. It was a good time. I did another ICT in July (it was a high key), and it was fun too. I can't really complain too much.

However, I could have been better deployed, the only time I used my knowledge was when I did a simple network simulation for NDP 2008 to identify choke points in the movement of performers to and from the floating platform. There was a certain SAF Operations Research Office in MINDEF and I would have definitely been better deployed there. My skill level would have been, conservatively putting it, between that of a Senior Analyst and Principal Analyst, and since the equivalent pay would be between $5k-$8k, that would have meant considerable cost savings to MINDEF, along with the introduction of new ideas to that office. (Well, the money may be peanuts to a certain some, but the ideas would be even more expensive to buy.)

It would not have been too difficult for the Central Manpower Base to have conducted interviews with returning scholars to determine if they might be better deployed elsewhere. It is markedly unfair if this process is only available to the privileged and well connected.

If the purpose of National Service is to train young men to be a cohesive fighting force to serve as a credible deterrent, the claim that a descendent or relative or a minster can better serve the nation in NS by not really doing NS is highly disingenuous and dishonest.

Force Structure Amid Transformation

We are in the process of a massive transition. We are moving to a 3G SAF, with this and that and this capability. Of late, we have seen the addition of new equipment to our arsenal which promises that we will be able to deliver more hurt with greater precision and with a lower prospect of getting hurt ourselves.

Old equipment is being phased out, nearing the ends of their system life cycles. As we progressively undergo greater and more rapid change, the issue of training and knowledge retention arises starkly. This is particularly true if the pace of technology dictates that system life cycles have to be re-examined (in particular, shortened).

The NS Man, may have to learn to operate a number of different weapons systems as his old expertise becomes obsolete in the face of rapid technological change. Instruction is a problem, do we have the manpower with the expertise to conduct instruction. I propose a modification of our force structure to accommodate this need.

Consider forming some battalions consisting an evergreen crop of NSFs and rotating NS Men, lasting the lifetime of the NSFs liability. In those battalions, NSFs aid in the training of their NS Man colleagues in newer weapon systems where needed. Teaching another is perhaps one of the most effective means of reinforcing and understanding what one has learnt. The training workload will be effectively shared. Furthermore, we accrue a further benefit. Younger NSFs will become more connected to the pulse of the country through interactions with NS Men who have been working and have seen more of life in Singapore. They will benefit from the experience that their older colleagues share. This mixing of young and old may have other social benefits such as bringing younger Singaporeans closer to opportunities such as jobs, and opening them up to possibilities that otherwise may only be observed with the benefit of personal experience.

In addition to this, hardcore expertise is needed to effectively harness the potential of equipment. We have often heard the phrase, "it's not how big or long it is, it is how you use it". Similarly, long range weaponry is only as good as the operator (and can only be as good as its specs, but we'll buy or develop something better if we're in danger of saturation). Centres of excellence/knowledge which give back to the entire organization are important to have for systems that are widely used. I believe in the need for regular battalions to act as centres of knowledge from which master trainers and leaders can arise. These individuals are to be the catalysts for competency development within non-regular units. There already is a movement towards this, but it's value bears reiteration.

Naturally, if this is to work, processes have to be worked out and studied in order to strike a balance between component and integrated training. I successfully pulling this off will be a boost to our overall competency, improve our force multiplier and hence contribute to greater security.

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Update & Clarification (8 May 2009):
I've been told that currently, NS Men are sometimes deployed to work alongside regulars to understand the mind of the regular and doctrinal issues. I envisioned more of some units with NSFs being present for their liability with NS Men entering and leaving (with ICTs remaining short). At times, there would be training, at others, exercises proper. Training in exercising leadership and initiative is something experienced NS Men have to offer, NSFs in turn are in touch with state of the art technology.

Perhaps the greatest benefit I see is not so much operational as social. A connected mindset, where young NSFs are able to "grow up" faster through contact with people who have been in the world. Operationally, this social benefit will create a more engaged NSF population so they see the intended social function of NS. It doesn't matter that most will not see NS as a machine for defending the nation so much as a vehicle for transforming boys to men and an immersion into real society (by meeting people). The fact of the matter is an engaged soldier is a more effective soldier. This is what has been termed a "head fake". Making someone think he is doing something useful to him, while the real intention is for him to pick up skills. This is the idea behind some software for storyboarding (ALICE) where users (kids) think they are making a movie, but are actually learning principles of computer science.

Operationally, the effectiveness of the army is no longer how many can be fielded, as is reflected in the intent of MM Lee when he advocated a conscript system. (Being able to field a huge number of troops after a few years of running the NS system.) Also, technical obsolescence is no longer something the systems architect and master planner can really control. Speculatively, a new coating could render obsolete every radar (advanced or otherwise) in the world, while being developed in secret and deployed throughout an airforce within a matter of a day (or a few days). The cliche that "the rules have changed" is continually in effect at each break through of the arms race that sits in the background of business and commerce.

From this perspective, having a parallel system whereby all NS Men can be brought up to speed rapidly to the state of the art (perhaps at the expense of some aspect of the training of some NSFs) has value.